The traps behind the failure of Malpasset arch dam, France, in 1959  by Duffaut, Pierre
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The  case of the  Malpasset  arch  dam  failure  in  1959  has been  widely  exposed  in scientiﬁc  and  technical
forums  and  papers.  The  focus  here  is on  the  many  traps  which  have  confused  the whole  chain  of bodies  and
persons  involved,  owner,  designer,  geologist,  contractor,  up  to the  state  management  ofﬁcers.  When  the
ﬁrst traps  were  hidden  inside  geology,  many  more  appeared,  as well  geotechnical,  technical,  fortuitous,eywords:
ams
eology
ock mechanics
tate control
and  administrative.  In addition  to such  factual  factors,  human  and  organizational  factors  may  be today
easily  identiﬁed,  when  none  of them  was  yet  suspected.  Both  dam  safety  and  rock  mechanics  beneﬁted
from  the  studies  done  since  the Malpasset  case,  most  of  them  within  one  decade.
©  2013  Institute  of  Rock  and  Soil  Mechanics,  Chinese  Academy  of  Sciences.  Production  and  hosting  by
Elsevier  B.V. All  rights  reserved.
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. Introduction
On 2 December 1959, the failure of Malpasset dam (Fig. 1) was
 prominent industrial catastrophe in France within the 20th cen-
ury, only second by number of victims to a coal dust explosion in
ourrières mine 53 years before. It was also a clap of thunder in the
orld dam community as never before any arch dam had failed,
s André Coyne had pointed when opening a symposium on arch
ams in 1957 as president of International Commission on Large
ams (ICOLD). It is well known that many more have been built
ince worldwide, and far higher, without any failure either. Many
apers have described the Malpasset case, from the early studies
o construction, operation and failure, the expert reports, the trial
inutes and many lab and site investigations launched in order to
nderstand what went wrong, ending with ﬁve papers published
n 2010 in Revue Franc¸ aise de Géotechnique (Carrère, 2010; Duffaut,
010; Goguel, 2010a, b; Habib, 2010).
No surprise the ﬁrst traps have been geological ones: for long,
gneous and metamorphic rocks had been experienced as impervi-
us enough for reservoirs and strong enough for dam foundations.∗ Tel.: +33 6 7110 2972.
E-mail address: pierre.duffaut@gmail.com
eer review under responsibility of Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese
cademy of Sciences.
674-7755 © 2013 Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of
ciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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sere they proved impervious, but failed as foundation. As the
uthor began working in 1948 with EDF, the French authority for
lectricity, in the Geology Department, he took part in the studies
f many dam sites in France. He is now one of very few living geo-
ogical engineers (if even anyone worldwide) to have worked in the
eld of dams at this time, when a great number of sites were inves-
igated, in France and abroad. Neither EDF nor the author had been
nvolved in Malpasset dam before the failure, while they imme-
iately manifested their highest interest in the case. EDF was  yet
perating many arch dams, and many more were at construction
r design stage. To the author, the case may  look as a family affair,
s his father Joseph Duffaut, had spent his whole career in dams.
hen Malpasset failed, the author was  resident engineer on an
rch dam construction site, just completed; his father was  the ﬁrst
ivil servant sent to the site by the government, the day after, as
ead of the Dam and Electricity department in the Ministry of Pub-
ic Works; he then followed all the studies and trial sessions and
he author could beneﬁt his early pictures on site as well as his phi-
osophy, “from father to son”. After that his career was turned from
eological Engineering into Rock Mechanics.
One knows that most rare accidents derive from many wrong
vents together instead of only one; many more traps were to be
oon discovered in addition to geological ones: geotechnical tests
n site and in lab showed unsuspected and very poor properties;
echnical rules about uplift were not applied to thin dams! Two
ortuitous events at the same time confused the local authorities, a
orksite downstream and a ﬂash ﬂood. Last, and the more, no inde-
endent state control had ever been done on this public project,
either before nor during construction and operation. Since the
id-20th century, partly under pressure from the most hazardous
ndustries, oil, aerospace, and nuclear activities, non-technical fac-
ors of accidents safety have been studied more and more and many
cientists pointed that complexity is a hazard in itself: they showed
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This year it rained a lot in autumn, resulting in the reservoir
level increasing over any levels attained before. Contrary to pre-
vious years, the bottom gate was  not opened to control the levelFig. 1. Malpasset dam, left, at end of construction, summer 1
ow the weight of human and organizational factors could be heav-
er than factual and technical ones. The Malpasset case can bring
hem one more example.
The purpose of the paper is to explain how people in charge
ave been abused by so many traps, while what had been done
here up to completion of the dam was correct within the practices
f 1950s. So the responsibility of the catastrophe must be shared
y many bodies and persons, the last one being a prefect, the local
epresentative of the government, who did not know that a danger-
us structure inside his territory was not managed by a competent
nough staff. Many dams worldwide have been deeply modiﬁed
long the years and a few have been put out of service when their
esponsible manager happened to discover they did not behave as
afely as expected. So the memory must be saved of André Coyne
nd his dam engineering Bureau, (appearing below under acronym
OB, Coyne and Bellier), always active today as Tractebel Engineer-
ng France, a member of GDF-SUEZ.
. What happened
About 15 km from Fréjus, an old Roman city on the Côte d’Azur,
long Mediterranean Sea, at a place called Malpasset (a bad pass
or passing people), a dam had been designed and built in 1950s
o provide irrigation and drink water from Reyran, a very small
iver. Prof. G. Corroy of Marseilles University delivered the geolog-
cal report, André Coyne and his Bureau COB designed the arch dam
Figs. 2 and 3) and supervised the whole construction works, made
ig. 2. Site map, contours in meters over sea level (1: bottom gate; 2: surface weir;
:  water intake; 4: stilling basin); at right a gravity thrust block protected from
ater thrust by a wing wall counteracts the crest arch thrust.
F
t
o
ohoto COB); right, soon after failure, end 1959 (photo Mary).
y contractor Ballot. None of them kept any mission from the owner
fter completion, in spite of the dam having never been formally
hecked; along the ﬁrst years its ﬁlling up was  prevented by lack of
xpropriation of a ﬂuorite mine upstream of the dam, and later this
eservoir was  left unused as the water distribution network had
ot been completed. A geodesy company made four yearly mea-
urements on about 30 targets (Fig. 4), but nobody interpreted the
esults of the year 1959, which had been transferred lately to the
wner.ig. 3. Highest dam cross section (mosl means meter over sea level). The support of
he  hollow valve and its control gate explains the widened foundation at this place
nly. Crest elevation: 102.55 m over sea level; spillway elevation: 100.4 m; normal
peration level: 98.5 m; bedrock level: 38 m.
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Fig. 5. The most conspicuous features of the site exposed after failure. Top, the
“dihedral” excavation with half of the thrust block fallen after the ﬂow (the
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tures. On many dam sites where contour lines accidents suggested
a weak zone, their investigation used trenches instead of boreholes.
The cleaning action of the ﬂow made the fault path visible on the
right bank and daylighted its cross section at either bank toe (Fig. 6).ig. 4. Graph of the reservoir level along years 1954–1959. The box magniﬁes the
our latest days, and triangles mark the dates of geodesy measurements A–D (after
ary, 1968).
ecause a motorway bridge was under construction 1 km down-
tream of the dam and nobody took account of any ﬂow in the river.
rom November 30 to December 2, the rain intensity was such that
he level rose 4.5 m in spite of the reservoir area increasing for each
eter more (box in Fig. 4); the “normal” autumn rain had peaked as
 sudden ﬂash ﬂood which was close to overﬂow the weir. In spite
f a late opening of the bottom gate, the dam gave off at 23:11 and
 huge wave wiped all structures along the valley, up to a small
ilitary airport on the seashore, making more than 400 casualties
nd a lot of destruction including all rail and roadways across the
alley.
. The traps
.1. Geological traps
The gross site of the reservoir was a narrow section through a
mall gneiss horst across a wide valley carved in coal measures, a
ocky tract for easily damming a big reservoir. At ﬁrst sight, the
ock mass of this old metamorphic horst did not appear different
rom so many dam sites in other parts of France. After the failure,
 ﬂow of 50 million cubic meters of water have cleaned the slopes
erfectly from any loose or even weathered material, the rock mass
tructure appeared very heterogeneous and crisscrossed by joints
t any scale and in any direction as noticed by prominent geologist
ean Goguel (Goguel, 2010b) who surveyed the whole site soon
fter the failure. The geological history of the Estérel massif, now
etter known, may  explain this peculiar structure which nobody
ad expected.
Only the failure daylighted two features of the rock mass which
roved instrumental. A huge block of foundation rock was missing
here was the left half of the dam arch, leaving an excavation in
 dihedral form limited by two subplane faces, always visible now
top of Fig. 5). Its downstream face is a true fault plane with a thin
over of crushed rock (fresh scratches on the surface proved the
hole block had moved upwards). Its upstream face looks as a set
f tears along two or more foliation surfaces, without any crushed
ock. Neither the fault nor the foliation had been recognized before;
he contours on Fig. 2 could have helped to infer the position of
he fault, but its strike perpendicular to the valley axis and its dip
bout 45◦ upstream would have considered it as perfectly neutral
ith respect to the thrusts received from the dam; the continuity of
ock foliation had not appeared either, within the so heterogeneous
tructure of the gneiss. So a geometrical trap was  in place, waiting
or a force susceptible to move the block, which will appear later.
F
c
Dxploratory adit at right was bored early after the failure to make jack tests in situ);
elow, a wide crevice is open just upstream of the concrete arch, wider at the base
nd  closing more higher (photos Duffaut, 1960).
One may  question why  boreholes had not previously located
he fault. First, most boreholes investigated the depth to the sound
ock, under alluvium in the river bed and under any loose grounds
long the valley slopes. Second, it is today difﬁcult to recall that the
echnology of core recovery was  not able to investigate such fea-ig. 6. Close view of a cross section of the main fault on right bank. The ﬁnely
rushed borders of the fault zone are well visible, thickness about metric (photo
uffaut, 1960).
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Fig. 7. Deformation modulus measured on 17 dam sites (V: arch; P: concrete grav-
ity;  E: rockﬁll). Modulus scale in MPa, logarithmic; sites classiﬁed by decreasing
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Fig. 8. Distribution of unconﬁned compressive strength Rc in bar (=0.1 MPa) on dry
samples (échantillons) collected on the left bank; three sets of cylinders, diameters
10,  36, and 60 mm (Bernaix, 1967). Comparison between three cases shows the
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sodulus along three curves, maximal, average and minimal values (graph designed
y  B. Goguel, from EDF data).
At rock matrix scale, some samples (Goguel, 2010b) revealed the
ock close to the dihedral contained more sericite than elsewhere,
 mica like mineral susceptible to increase the deformability and
ecrease the strength. He wrote: “I think . . . the failure is due to the
oor mechanical strength of a gneiss which happens to contain dis-
ersed sericite” (this observation was not followed with any tests
f strength and deformability, and no rock block from the dihedral
as been sampled to check this inﬂuence). Weathering of the gneiss
as been pointed by some experts, but instead of any observation
onﬁrming its inﬂuence; the absence of any slope slide upstream
f the dam during the fast drawdown and the perfect state of the
oman aqueduct at mid-height proved the global strength of the
lopes.
.2. Geotechnical traps
There had been no geotechnical investigations before the con-
truction of the dam. Immediately after the failure, several studies
ere launched, at ﬁrst on site, by seismic methods and jack tests,
nd in laboratories on samples taken from the site.
Refraction traverses showed a compact rock (velocity over
000 m/s) below a shallow zone with velocity closer to 2500 m/s.
Petite sismique (Schneider, 1967): A new short range seismic
echnology, easy to use on site, conﬁrmed the high deformability
f the rock in situ, together with the high compactness of the rock
ass. The dynamic modulus derived from both deep refraction tra-
erses and shallow Petite sismique was around 1500 MPa, a rather
ow ﬁgure for a dam foundation.
Jack tests (Talobre, 1957): EDF sent immediately a team to per-
orm jack tests in a few small pits and galleries purposely bored.
s very few such tests on dam sites were available for comparison,
DF ordered same tests be made on seven sites the same year and
alpasset provided by far the weaker results.
Later the practice became usual on most new sites, as shown in
ig. 7 which gathers the results for 17 sites and conﬁrms the very
igh deformability of the rock mass, ten times less than that on
ost sites, hundred times less than that on best sites.
Such low deformability was unsuspected and even the Saint
assien dam site, close to Malpasset on the same rock type had
rovided results two times more.
Lab tests: Rock samples were sent to various labs, mainly
cole Polytechnique, Palaiseau (LMS, Laboratoire de Mécanique
es solides), École des Mines, Paris-Fontainebleau, and École de
éologie, Nancy. The main set of tests results was described and
t
d
mcale effect: maximum strength occurs on smaller cylinders, where scatter also is the
ighest (vertical axis: number of samples; M:  average value; : standard deviation).
iscussed in a thesis work at LMS  under supervision of Pierre Habib
Bernaix, 1967).
Standard uniaxial compressive and tensile tests were performed
n cylinders with diameters 10–60 mm  and the same height to
iameter ratio, 2.0. Strength values did not appear too low in aver-
ge (58 MPa  at dry state, and 42.5 MPa  at saturated), but their scatter
ppeared by far wider than usual (coefﬁcient of variation about
.36), so providing many spots with high deformability. Taking
arious dimensions, a high scale effect was detected, as seen in
ig. 8. Systematic studies on various rock types showed that scatter
nd scale effect went together and provided a reliable fracturation
riteria.
Actually, all types of classical lab tests were performed, and one
ore: the permeability being very low, Habib (2010) proposed a
ew type of test to make measurements without any risk of error
ue to leaks along the envelope of the sample; thanks to a coaxial
ole in the rock cylinder, a radial ﬂow is generated from or to the
ole depending if the ﬂuid pressure is applied around or inside.
hen the ﬂow is centrifuge, the rock is set in a tensile state which
akes the permeability increase with the pressure, whatever the
ock type; conversely a ﬂow toward the hole creates a compressive
tate which does not alter the permeability of most rock types;
ut all samples from Malpasset showed a high sensitivity of the
ermeability, the more on the left bank: though rather low, the
ermeability decreased a lot under compression, due to closure of
inute cracks. Not any other rock displayed such a behavior.
This unsuspected property, high sensitivity to stress, was  then
upposed to be the main cause of failure, as the load applied by
he dam on the foundation rock induced a deep “underground
am” against which the uplift pressure could build more and
ore. Here was the force to move the dihedral. Actually, the high
d Geotechnical Engineering 5 (2013) 335–341 339
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Fig. 9. Displacements of the targets along arches at elevation 78 and 90 m (after
Mary, 1968); bold letters refer to measurement dates (Fig. 4); other letters name the
construction joints between monoliths; the scale applies to target displacements:
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eformability was susceptible to play the same role: when the dam
oves downstream under the water thrust, the rock upstream
oes not follow and a crack opens between the concrete and the
ock as seen in Fig. 5 (below). The more deformable the rock mass
s, the wider the crack opens, the deeper it extends, so increasing
he height of the dam with a hydrostatic thrust increasing as the
quare of the height. Whichever mechanism prevails, the force on
he dihedral is the same.
The anisotropy of the rock mass may  provide another more
echanism: Maury (1970) investigated the stress bulb under a
oundation which becomes thinner and deeper when the thrust
s perpendicular to the stratiﬁcation or schistosity; this inﬂuence
as not well known at the time.
.3. Technical traps
After the failure of Bouzey small gravity dam (eastern France),
évy (1895) showed that pressure from water seeping below and
nside a structure plays as Archimede’s thrust on buoying vessels
nd named it sous-pression (uplift). Most gravity dams were since
reserved from it by relief holes; a so-called “drainage curtain”
ecame a corollary of classical tightness curtains, but thin dams
ere thought immune thanks to the smaller area of their base.
alpasset opened the eyes of dam designers on uplift acting not
nly below and inside the structure, but also inside the rock mass
ownstream.
It became clear that any dam is a gravity dam, contrary to
he usual classiﬁcation of dams (Duffaut, 1992) provided enough
round mass be included in the gross resistant weight against the
ater thrust.
.4. Incidental traps
Money inﬂation: In 1950s, the money in France (and in many
ore Europe states) was inﬂating at a high rate. The sum allowed
or the project was ﬁxed, the owner was pressed to see the job
nished in order to avoid the cost rise and he did not follow a rec-
mmendation of the geologist to make some more investigations.
his monetary trap has been focused by Jean Goguel at the trial
Goguel, 2010a).
Bridge worksite: In 1959, a motorway was to be built from Aix-
n-Provence to Nice which had to cross the Reyran river about 1 km
ownstream of the dam: earthworks had begun during summer
onths and the bridge worksite was glad to beneﬁt a zero discharge
n the river thanks to the dam; so the gate was kept close and the
evel rose higher than ever before, without any extra test or survey.
Flash ﬂood: At the end of November, a ﬂash ﬂood occurred and
he level rose dramatically (box in Fig. 4). One may  notice such
oods had been neglected from the design stage.
Geodesy contract: One could add the late delivery of the August
959 measurements: the director of the company in charge of them
as called to the trial for having delayed their delivery: he argued
he length of calculations plus the summer vacations of his staff.
ormally his contract did not ask for any interpretation or compar-
son with previous results. When the owner received the results
Fig. 9), nobody had paid attention and they were forwarded to the
refect to be included in the dam ﬁles.
Cracks in the stilling basin: No report was produced which con-
rmed the date, the location and the importance of appeared cracks
 few days before the catastrophe in the reinforced concrete of the
tilling basin without any schemes and photographs. One wonders
hat the guard was not specially auditioned on a material element
usceptible to alert the staff in charge, at any level, on a disorder
usceptible to be a sign of imminent danger. This element reﬂects
he importance that each member of an organization is aware of
n
d
wegments CD,  between measurements 1958–1959, show a general move toward the
eft  bank, a fact any professional could have noticed as a change of behavior, long
efore the latest 5 m rise.
ts role in the safety of operation. If it is not an unfounded rumor,
t is a grave failure of the organization, maybe a grave fault of the
uard. At least, the concern of the staff in charge had led them to
ummon Coyne (and Ballot) at a close date, which has proved too
ate.
.5. State management traps
The Var département, an administrative level of the State, was
he owner, deprived of any dam specialist. It relied on the Engineer
or design and for construction supervision but did not asked for
ny more mission after the end of construction; the formal réception
commissioning) did not wait for any test at full level, as was usual
ut not mandatory, by lack of water and because the property rights
f the whole reservoir area had not been bought; the prefect signed
t in order to permit full payment of contractors without asking the
wner to perform any more surveys.
. Human and organizational factors
Lack of dialog with more than two persons (the Geologist sent
eports but did not meet the Engineer on site). In France, Coyne
sed to work with EDF, a national company with many experi-
ented engineers, and under permanent supervision of a corps
f well trained state engineers. Neither EDF nor this corps were
nvolved in Malpasset.One may  wonder administrative borders be tight against tech-
ical information exchange: along the same years a bigger arch
am, Bimont, was being built within 100 km of Malpasset for drink
ater of Marseilles under the next département Bouches-du-Rhône
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s owner, but not any link appeared between the teams in charge
f those dams in spite of both the geologist and the engineer being
he same.
And the more one must notice the lack of any control by a third
arty (which was soon created and made mandatory for all dams
ver 15 m height).
. Other catastrophes
Many comparisons may  be made with a series of catastrophes
ithin the 20th century and up to now:
1) coal-dust explosion in the Courrières mine in France in 1906,
when nobody could think a coal-dust explosion could reach so
far;
2) drowning of the British liner Titanic in 1912 after collision with
an iceberg: from the ofﬁcers and all passengers on board, to
the general public worldwide, the liner was thought of as non-
submersible and the staff denied the cables received about the
drift of icebergs;
3) explosion of the English dirigible R101 (1930, near Beauvais,
France) during its inaugural ﬂight, operated before completion
of the convincing steps of the experimental stage, to fulﬁll polit-
ical ambitions: a fault shared with Malpasset and Vajont (see
below);
4) deadly Aberfan debris ﬂow in South Wales in 1966: in spite of
many small shallow slides on sterile coal mine heaps, the height
has been increased higher than experienced before (Duffaut,
1982);
5) explosion of the American Space Shuttle Challenger (1986)
after many warnings about failed joints in the solid rocket
booster and the decision to maintain the launch to meet polit-
ical requirements of NASA (aimed to obtaining next budgets);
6) crash of ﬂight AF447 (offshore Brasil, 2009), the staff of which
was caught in a tropical tempest and deprived from data from
frozen Pitot tubes;
7) Fukushima tsunami induced nuclear accident (2011, Japan),
where the local staff was left without any means of action when
both water cooling of the reactors and electric power were put
out of service by a wave higher than supposed.
Soon after Malpasset, another dam catastrophe occurred in the
olomites, Northeastern Italy: the fall of Monte Toc slope into the
ajont reservoir on 9 October 1963. It displaced the water from
he reservoir, which swept 2000 people in the valley downstream:
s the slope was moving slowly along two years, the engineers
hank they could control the slide through management of the
eservoir level, ignoring the lesson of the celebrated Goldau slide,
witzerland, 200 years before, which had suddenly accelerated
nd destructed the city (Heim, 1932; Erismann and Ebele, 2001).
eopold Müller who was in charge of the geotechnical studies
ocused on the reinforcement of the rock mass through many rock
nchors on both banks (which actually proved efﬁcient: Leonards
1987) stated that the Vajont dam withstood a load eight times
reater than it was designed to bear). The actual trap was the con-
dence in the management of the slide in front of a transfer of
roperty from a local company to a State one.
. Human and organizational factors of catastrophes:
normal accident” theoriesIn addition to the lack of civil Rock Mechanics, which was to
e derived from the studies following the catastrophe, one must
otice that social research on major accidents was  also in infancy
a
H
a
Dtechnical Engineering 5 (2013) 335–341
n the ﬁfties: after works on accidents by Patrick Lagadec in France,
harles Perrow in the US, James Reason in UK and many other
ince, under pressure from high hazardous activities, it is now well
nderstood that nature and industry build together so complex sys-
ems than nobody can any longer master all hazardous interactions
nside them.
In France, Lagadec (1979) introduced the concept of Major Tech-
ological Hazard and performed reviews of many major accidents.
n his famous book, “Normal accidents”, Perrow (1984) wrote after
he Three Mile Island nuclear accident: “we  might stop blaming
he wrong people and the wrong factors”; he stated that in com-
lex systems, “multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are
nevitable”: the accident becomes “normal”! The aerospace indus-
ry, NASA at the ﬁrst place, ordered many studies which beneﬁted
o all most hazardous industries, nuclear energy to begin with.
hese studies have quickly highlighted the importance not only
f human functioning but also the inﬂuence of organizations as
utlined by James Reason “we  cannot change the human condi-
ions, but we  can change the conditions under which people work”
Reason, 1990).
. Conclusions
The geology set the ﬁrst traps; the mechanical behavior of the
ock aggravated the dangerous forces; the practice of drainage only
as of rule under thick dams; two  fortuitous circumstances, the
onstruction of a bridge and a ﬂash ﬂood, conjugated; all of those
raps were in a way  preparatory causes. Money inﬂation, lack of
ny state control, blindness in front of alarms, and absence of any
ualiﬁed staff completed the scenery. One should stress as well
he technical isolation of André Coyne, instead of the high level of
mplication of engineers of both EDF and the state in hydro-dams
nside France.
It was highly uneasy, either at the trial, some years after, or,
ome decades later at Purdue University (Leonards, 1987), and it is
et today uneasy too, half a century later, to discuss how engineers
erformed in the early ﬁfties; it may  look easy to charge them with
utrageous transgressions of elementary rules of art, when no such
ules did exist at the time: most of the rules enforced today have
een derived from the results of the Malpasset case history; within
 few years, many had yet become evident. Geological materials
re opaque, we  cannot see through, so it may  be compared with a
ock, the mechanism of which is purposely hidden behind a steel
late; in most geotechnical problems the thrust to turn the key is
rovided by groundwater. While geology may  be investigated as
uch as needed, future events are not predictable, from rain and
ood to earthquakes and tsunamis, to worksites, and even societal
ovements.
For sure the catastrophe has brought many useful teachings:
he way dam sites were investigated before construction and the
ay dams were managed during operation has been since deeply
hanged worldwide, but my  purpose here is to recall what has been
one before construction was “normal” at the time, while what has
een done after was not.
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